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INTRODUCTION:
Nations do not conduct warfare in the same manner as all other nations that they may go
to war against or with. A nation may share general characteristics of warfare with other nations,
but every nation is made up of different components. Some nations will have more of a particular
type of resource, others will specialize in a particular kind of warfare, and the culture of the
people may drive them towards a particular style of warfare. Another way nations differ from
each other is their relationship between their technology and tactics in battle. This paper will
focus on what the relationship was between England's armor technology and battlefield tactics
from 1415 to 1515.
In order to analyze this relationship, the development of armor throughout 1415-1515
needs to be understood. Armor has several components that contribute to its effectiveness on the
battlefield. This paper focuses on the shape of the armor, the metallurgy of the armor, the
thickness of the armor, and the weight of the armor. The shape of armor will provide insight into
what the armor was designed to do: what were the designers of the armor trying to get weapons
to do when the weapons came into contact with the armor. The metallurgical change will show
the strength of armor from different periods during 1415-1515. With an improvement in
metallurgy, the thickness and weight of armor can be reduced because it is no longer necessary
to have so much metal to achieve a similar degree of protectiveness. On the other hand, thickness
might stay the same or even increase if the designers of armor found it necessary to put more
steel between the fighter and the weapons used against him. Changes in weight can demonstrate
how much the fighter valued his mobility and endurance versus increased protection. These
components then need consideration in relation to changes in tactics on the battlefield.
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To determine if there is tactical change in English battles during 1415-1515, the
components of tactics need analysis. The components of tactics analyzed here are the changes in
weapons, changes in the composition of the army, changes in the choice of topography, and
changes in the preference for offense versus defense. Weapons are the thing on the battlefield
that armor is directly attempting to counter, so changes in weapons or armor will have
ramifications on each other. A change in the composition of the army, what type of soldier is
fighting, is important because different types of soldiers have different needs, expose themselves
to different types of threat, and have to perform different tasks in their armor. A cavalryman does
not have to use his body the same way an archer does, and the archer does not have to use his
body in the same way as a dismounted man-at-arms. Where an army chooses to fight has tactical
implications; different positions provide advantages and disadvantages. Finally, an army
preferring to be on the offense or defense will expose the soldiers to different kinds of threats
and demands. A defender does not have to move around the battlefield as much, but an
individual attacker may be more concerned about delivering the strongest blow possible, which
could be impeded by armor. Alternatively, by being the attacker, a soldier may expose himself to
more danger so more protection would be of the utmost importance. These components of
tactics, when compared with the components of armor, will further the understanding of what
soldiers valued during 1415-1515.
The relationship between armor and battlefield tactics during 1415-1515 England will
help further the understanding of how humans utilize technology. This paper will look into if
technology drives battlefield change or if battlefield change drives technology or both. The paper
will help assess the relative value of trying to use technology to manipulate the battlefield, versus
manipulating technology to fit the battlefield.
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HISTORIOGRAPHY:
Tobias Capwell’s book Armour of the English Knight 1400-1450 explores the
development of armor throughout the first half of the fifteenth century. A problem that Capwell
runs into is the fact that there is not a large collection of surviving armor from this period.
Capwell’s solution to this problem is the use of effigies of English knights that died throughout
the period.1 Effigies are the main three-dimensional source for the interpretation of armor that
has survived to the present day from fifteenth-century England.2 Having a three-dimensional
representation allows the observer to see how different pieces fit together better. Three
dimensions can also show more accurately where on the body the armor fit. This solution allows
Capwell to trace stylistic changes in armor to include the addition of new pieces of armor, the
changing in the design, which areas are more or less protected, and to see where the pieces are
designed to move. Another reason why effigies are useful to use is that there is no evidence that
the sculptors used stock designs; rather, each was uniquely made.3 Effigies are also known to
have been quite expensive, which leads Capwell to believe that the patrons would want their
likenesses to be captured accurately.4
Capwell's premise for why the English would have their own distinctive armor style is
because the English were tactical trendsetters, so since other armor styles were designed for
other types of tactics, the English would need their own type of armor.5 To help solidify his
claim that the English were tactically trendsetters Capwell points out that the English were able

1

Tobias Capwell, Armour of the English Knight: 1400-1450 (Great Britain: Park Communications, 2015),

8.
2

Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 43.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., 6.
3
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to defeat the French even when the English were outnumbered.6 In order to understand the
English change in armor and why it was different from other countries Capwell looked into the
tactics that the English used versus what other countries use. The Italians, Capwell points out,
were predominately using shock cavalry troops.7 The English, however, were using archers
combined with dismounted knights and men-at-arms as their primary tactical unit.8 Capwell
claims that since these men were fighting on foot, they were using primarily two-handed
weapons, which would require the men raise their arms above the heads, unlike the shock
cavalry troop who would be mainly aiming downwards.9
Capwell’s work is a wonderful foundation to explore how changes in armor relate to
changes at the tactical level of war. A limitation of Capwell’s work is that effigies cannot
provide information on if there was a change in the weight of armor, nor can they be relied upon
to discover if there was a change in thickness of armor. Effigies cannot be weighed in a useful
way to tell how armor weight changed, and effigies are made out of stone making all
measurements for thickness impractical. Also expanding Capwell’s work to the entirety of the
fifteenth century could show more distinct changes.
Alan Williams’ The Knight and the Blast Furnace: A History of the Metallurgy of
Armour in the Middle Ages & the Early Modern Period is an in-depth look on how metallurgy
developed and the use of metallurgy in arms and armor throughout Europe. Williams looks into
how metal was forged into different items for war and how to strengthen metal.10 Williams also

6

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., 20.
10
Alan Williams, The Knight and the Blast Furnace: A History of the Metallurgy of Armor in the Middle
Ages & the Early Modern Period (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 877, 893.
7
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explores how effective weapons, longbows, crossbows, polearms, swords, axes, and firearms are
against armor.11 Williams uses both the thickness of armor and metal quality to understand how
armor progressed over time.12 A weakness of Williams' research is that majority of the armor
used for thickness is centered on the second half of the sixteenth century. The armor is from
different locations around Europe, which can be a strength because the general trend is
observable, but it does not help with the understanding of different tactics from different regions;
for that the data must split apart. Williams, moreover, is mainly focused on the protective
capabilities of armor. That consideration must be taken into account in combination with other
aspects of the functionality of armor in order to improve the overall understanding of the purpose
of armor design the way it was.
Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy’s The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary
Rose is a tactical exploration of the bow throughout English history. This work is useful because
of the tactical exploration of key battles throughout the fifteenth century and how the role of the
bow changed throughout. Strickland and Hardy analyze, among others, the battle of Agincourt,
the combats of the English civil wars of the fifteenth century, and the battle of Flodden.13
Strickland and Hardy look at where in the formation the bow is used and what tactics archers
employed in battle.14 They also look at how armor responded to the development of the bow.15
Strickland and Hardy's work is extremely useful for the exploration of the question trying to be
answered throughout this paper. The Great Warbow provides the perspective of people trying to
defeat armor rather than people trying to improve armor against weapons. Strickland and Hardy

11

Ibid., 936, 945.
Ibid., 913-915, 740.
13
Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose
(Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2005), 318, 369, 395.
14
Ibid., 365.
15
Ibid., 266.
12
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also proved experimental data on the energy delivered and range of different bows. This will
prove useful against Williams’ research on how effective armor was at stopping or turning
impacts of different energy levels.
Malcom Vale uses the development of arms and armor to better understand changes on
the battlefield in his book War and Chivalry. By understanding how the battlefield changes, Vale
is able to better understand the change in war and changes in chivalry.16 Vale provides an
overview of changes in fifteenth-century warfare in Europe. Vale focuses on the changes in the
weight of armor throughout the fifteenth century to describe the technological change and has a
useful table that demonstrates those changes.17 He also draws the connection between changes in
the weight of armor and different tactical choices made by different countries.18
Synthesizing the different elements of the analysis presented by each of these authors will
produce a better understanding of the role armor had on the tactical changes on the English
battlefield during 1415-1515. Capwell provides a way to use effigies and armor changing armor
styles to understand how the English preferred to fight in the first half of the fifteenth century.
Williams demonstrates the importance of metallurgy and thickness is in making armor more
effective against the weapons of the day. Strickland and Hardy explain the tactics of the English
during the fifteenth century, and the role bows played it. By focusing on the bow Strickland and
Hardy provide a different perspective on armor, that is how to defeat the changes in armor. Vale
uses changes in armor to understand how cultural changes in the medieval world occurred and
how different countries attitudes created a different style of fighting. Bringing these methods

16
Malcom Vale, War, and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy
at the End of the Middle Ages (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1981), 100.
17
Ibid., 184-185.
18
Ibid., 121.
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together and focusing on the English during 1415-1515, a better understanding of the
relationship of tactics and technology will emerge.
METHODOLOGY:
In order to gain understanding the relationship between changes in armor and changes in
tactics in English warfare during 1415-1515, the timelines of changes of both armor and tactics
need to be understood. The first timeline is that of armor during 1415-1515; the second timeline
is that of tactics during 1415-1515. The timelines of both armor and tactics need to have several
subcategories in order to gain an understanding of what, if anything, is changing. Armor needs to
be broken down into the categories of the shape of the armor, the metallurgy of the armor, the
thickness of the armor, and the weight of the armor. Tactics need to be broken down into the
categories of the changes in weapons, changes in the composition of the army, changes in the
choice of topography, and changes in the preference of offense versus defense. The categories
that need examination are known the manner in which to examine them must be understood. The
armor categories will be examined first and then move to the armor categories.
The armor categories need examination in several different methods. The shape of armor
will be examined using Capwell’s technique of examining effigies and continuing his
examination through the year 1500 A.D. The key is here is find additions or subtractions to
armor styles. Williams’ work will enable the tracking of the hardness of armor. I will examine
changes in thickness mainly based on a selection of armor, helmets, and breastplates, from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art that date from different periods throughout the fifteenth century. I
measured each piece of armor in a multitude of places. The helmets were measured above the
right and left eye, right and left temple, and the back of the head. The breastplates were measured
over the heart, the left side of the breastplate, and the bottom right (covering the stomach region).
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This method was necessary because few historians or curators have made such measurements in
the past, especially for fifteenth-century pieces. However, I will supplement my measurements
with data provided by other scholars to the greatest extent possible. The weight of armor uses the
information from the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Wallace Collection. The downside to
examining the pieces from these museums is that they are not purely English pieces; they are
from all over Europe. However, they will provide a general trend in how the thickness and
weight of armor changed over time.
The tactical categories need examination in three different battles for the English. The
three battles are Agincourt (English versus French, October 25, 1415), Towton (York versus
Lancaster, March 29,1461), Flodden (English versus Scots, September 9, 1513). In each of these
battles, the weapons that the English use, as well as those used against them, will be examined.
The goal is to see if there is a significant change in the weapons used to defeat the enemy. Then
changes in the composition of the army will be examined. This category includes how much of
each type of soldier is included in the army, where those different types of soldiers arrayed on
the battlefield. The choice of topography for the battle will be examined. This section will
include topics such as weather, ground conditions, elevation, and natural obstacles. The final
category for tactics is the preference for offense or defense. This will be determined by pre-battle
actions, actions during the battle, and responses to enemy action.

ANALYSIS OF ARMOR:
Capwell’s effigies analysis will start the examination of armor changing over the fifteenth
century. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, English helmets were bascinets with
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aventails.19 A mail aventail is a piece of mail that is worn under a helmet, particularly helmets
that stop at the jawline, which is meant to protect the neck and upper shoulders. For a reference
look at the picture below, the figure on the right is wearing an aventail. This method maximized
the flexibility in the neck while still protecting the neck from slashes. The English also wore
cuirasses with some flexibility built into the sides.20 They also had full arm and leg protection
with “small side-wings.”21 These side-wings would protect the inner elbow and knee. Their
gauntlets had short cuffs and an hourglass appearance.22 This period also has a mail skirt to
protect the upper legs.23

19

Capwell, Armour, 56.
Ibid., 56.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
20
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24

Within the first ten years of the century, the English added besagews, oval plates, to
protect the shoulder joints.25 The snout on the bascinet had become rounder, and the mail
aventail was replaced with a plate aventail.26 These plate aventails were “composed of hoop-like

24

Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 60.
26
Ibid.
25
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plate, producing a more rigid defense which yet provides a similar level of mobility.”27 The
cuirass skirt adds a triangular piece of metal to protect the groin.28 On the legs and arms, the
side-wings are replaced with rondels, round disks of metal larger than the side-wings.29 This
change demonstrates that the English needed additional protection at their joints when they were
fighting. The English were also concerned about flexibility as can be seen in the plate aventail.
Instead of creating a solid aventail they still incorporate an element of flexibility.
The English make further adjustments to the bascinet after the second decade. A plate of
metal extended down from the helmet to cover the front and back of the neck.30 Mail makes
another appearance to go under the new neck plate, it also extends to the shoulders.31 This
suggests that the hoop system was not working well enough to prevent attacks to the throat. The
backplate of the cuirass is now a solid piece, the backplate used to be three separate pieces
latched together, and is hinged to the breastplate.32 Having the backplate riveted together
provides greater security and stability as opposed to having the backplate strapped together.
Following the third decade, Capwell finds that the bascinet continues to become more
rounded and that the neck plate is starting to shape more for the chin and throat.33 The cuirass
skirt extends all the way to mid-thigh and “tassests [are] introduced as narrow, oblong plates
strapped to the front and sides” of the skirt.34 These indicate that the English developed a
growing need to protect a larger portion of their legs beyond what a single piece of plate on the
thigh could provide. The besagews became fluted, similar to ridges running the length of the

27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 64.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 192.
34
Ibid.
28
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piece, and concave.35 There is also much less exposed mail worn; the only areas where mail is
the first line of defense is the inner elbow and knee.36
In the final decade that Capwell examines, 1440-1450, the cuirass skirt is shortened, but
the tasset is extended effectively cover the same amount of area.37 The majority of the armor has
become fluted at this point in development, in some areas, there are diagonally fluted instead of
vertically.38 On both the legs and arms the rondels have been replaced with large side-wings.39
The effigies from England after 1450 are rather scarce. I was able to only find two from the
1460s and one from 1484.40 To supplement the lack of English effigies I will also use effigies
from other European countries of the period. The effigies from the 1460s show that the English
removed the tasset and extended the length of the cuirass skirt to the mid-thigh. This is similarly
done in both Scotland and Germany during the 1460s and 1470s.4142 For the shoulders there is
contradicting evidence for whether there are rondels or not, seeing as how both before and after
the rondels are not included, I believe the inclusion of rondels to be an exception rather than the
rule for the 1460s. The German effigies still show the use of rondels, but the Scottish does not.
For the elbows there are either the wings as before or the rondels, most likely the rondels. For the
effigy from 1484, the major change is that the cuirass skirt is shortened to the upper thigh, but it
also lacks the tasset. The German armor appears to have something like a tasset, but it is still
much shorter than in earlier decades supporting the trend of shortening the cuirass skirt.43 Both

35

Ibid.
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 200.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
“Effigies & Brasses,” Effigies and Brasses, accessed May 3, 2018,
http://effigiesandbrasses.com/search/?year=1451&year_end=1500&tags=&institution=&name=.
41
Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2923/2480/.
42
Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/1215/1277/, http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2924/2481/.
43
Ibid., http://effigiesandbrasses.com/2929/2486/.
36
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of these periods seem to be following the armor design from the last decade Capwell described
except for the removal of the tasset. There are two reasons why they may have removed them.
The first being that the tasset may have gotten in the way while they were fighting. The second
explanation is that the quality of their leg armor improved, so the extra layer of metal became
redundant. A general trend cannot be established here because there are too few sources of
effigies after 1450.
The most detailed information available for the fifteenth century Williams provides is the
hardness of Innsbruck armor. The armor pieces that he looks at are dated from 1450 to 1500.
Williams measures the Vickers hardness (VPH) levels of 14 different pieces of armor. The
earliest piece has an oddly high VPH level, but generally as the years progress the average VPH
level increases.44 In 1460 the VPH level was 209 and by 1490 the VPH level around 381.

Hardness of Armour
600

Hardness VPH

500
400
300
200
100
0
1440

1450

1460

1470

1480

1490

1500

1510

Year

As the years progressed the hardness of armor got higher. This provides greater protection for
combatants in battle. There is a lack of armor from the earlier periods, but it seems that there is a

44

Williams, The Knight, 452-453.
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steady progression upwards on the hardness of armor. This would indicate that trying to increase
armor hardness was a constant effort rather than a direct response to anything.
The thickness of helmets was tracked in for different locations, the right eye, left eye, left
temple, right temple, and the back of the helmet. The thickness above the left eye is relatively the
same in the 1440s and 1490s.

Thickness Left Eye
Thickness mm

8
6
4
2
0
1430

1440

1450

1460

1470

1480

1490

1500

Year

In the 1470s the thickness is almost triple than either of the other two periods. This could be
because the hardness of the material improved from 1470 to 1490 so it was not as necessary to
put as much material into the helm, making it lighter and cheaper. The hardness from 1470 to
1490 improved by 2.5 times. The weight of helmets, as will be explored more later corresponds
to the increase in thickness. The 1470 has the second highest weights of 154 ounces, that is about
a doubling in weight from the 1390s. However, more samples need to found and measured to see
if the trend holds. This analysis holds true for the right eye as well.
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Thickness mm

Thickness Right eye
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1430

1440

1450

1460
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1480

1490

1500

Year

For the temple area the pattern is the same, but instead of being three times as thick, the helmet
from the 1470s is only twice as thick.

Left temple
Thickness mm

5
4
3
2
1
0
1430

1440

1450

1460

1470

1480

1490

1500

1480

1490

1500

Year

Thickness mm

Right Temple
5
4
3
2
1
0
1430

1440

1450

1460

1470

Year
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On the back of the helmet, the thickness has a slight decreases but is relatively stable throughout
the decades.

Back Left
Thickness mm

2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1430

1440

1450

1460

1470

1480

1490

1500

Year

An explanation for this could be that combatants were not getting attacked in the back of the
head so armorers took out the extra material so that the overall helmet would be lighter. Many of
Capwell’s explanations for changes in armor is that the new design provided greater flexibility
while adding protection. Having a lighter helmet would play into this idea.
The thickness of breast and backplates were measured in three areas, over the heart, on
the left side, and on the bottom right of the armor. The thickness over the heart appears to
increase by about thirty percent from 1470 to 1490.

Heart
Thickness mm

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1465

1470

1475

1480

1485

1490

1495

1500

1505

Year
53.138.4

29.150.68

29.150.68

29.158.155

53.138.1

29.158.143

48.149.32

2014.154

2014.673
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However, after 1490 the average thickness decreases again by about twenty percent. A similar
explanation to that of helmets seems to be reasonable in this circumstance as well. The thickness
of armor on the left side decreases at a steady rate from 1470 to 1500,starting at 1.6 millimeters
and decreasing to 0.7 millimeters. Williams provides a system to evaluate the effectiveness of
armor. Williams’ formula is 𝐸 =

80∗𝑇∗𝑇∗𝑊 45
.
𝐶𝑜𝑠 𝐴

E is the energy in defeat armor, T is the thickness of

armor, W is the coefficient of the quality of armor, and A is the angle of attack. If it is assumed
that the armor of 1.6 millimeters has the worst quality of armor and the armor of 0.7 millimeters
has the best quality of armor, as well as the angle is 45 degrees, then it is revealed that the 1.6
millimeter armor takes 144.815 joules and the 0.7 millimeter armor takes 83.156 joules. Since it
does not make sense for the effectiveness of armor to go down then a conclusion for this part of
armor could be that the left side of the body became a less of a concern as time progressed. So,
instead of putting material in area that is not important the armor design decided to put the
material in the area that was more important, over the heart for example, while still maintaining
the same weight.

Left Side
Thickness mm

2

53.138.4

1.5

29.150.69

1

29.150.68

0.5
0
1465

29.158.155
1470

1475

1480

1485

Year

1490

1495

1500

1505

53.138.1
29.158.143

The thickness at the bottom right of armor has a similar pattern, as over the heart, a general

45

Ibid., 935.
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increase up to 1490 then there is a decrease in thickness.

Thickness mm

Bottom Right
3

53.138.4

2

29.150.69

1

29.150.68

0
1465

29.158.155
1470

1475

1480

1485

1490

1495

1500

53.138.1

1505

Year

29.158.143

The weight of armor is the next portion of armor design that needs to be discussed. The
weight of helmets from 1390-1510 had a general pattern of increase in weight:

Helmet

Weight (oz)

200
180

W.C.L., A.69

160

14.25.573

140

W.C.L., A.74

120

A.E.M

100

W.C.L., A.78

80

W.C.L., A.151

60

A.E.M

40

29.158.3a

20

Churburg

0
1380

04.3.226
1400

1420

1440

1460

Year

1480

1500

1520

W.C.L., A.22

starting in 1390 at a weight of 61 ounces and ending in 1510 at 175 ounces. In 1490, there is a
significant drop in weight only to rise again in 1510. This pattern of weight generally aligns with
the thickness pattern discussed earlier.
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Back and Breastplate
300

Weight (oz)

250
200
150
100
50
0
1380

1400

1420

1440

1460

1480

1500

1520

Year
53.138.4

Met 53.138.1

W.C.L., A.21

29.150.69

29.150.68

Met 29.158.155

29.158.143

2014.673

W.C.L., A.22

2014.154

48.149.32

The breast and backplate weights remain fairly constant throughout the decades. In 1510, there is
an increase of about 70 ounces. This pattern does not perfectly align with the thickness.

ANALYSIS OF TACTICS:
The weapons used at Agincourt, October 25, 1415, by the English are longbows, axes,
maces, swords, spears, falcon beaks, mallets, and stakes.46 The French at Agincourt did not use
longbows; instead, their archers used crossbows as well as more conventional bows that were not
as powerful as the longbow.47 The longbow enabled the English to disrupt and stall all of the
French actions.48 The English men-at-arms primarily fought with long spears.49 The French
dismounted men-at-arms also primarily fought with spears.50

46

Anne Curry, Agincourt: A New History (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2006), 255.
Peter Reid, Medieval Warfare: Triumph and Domination in the Wars of the Middle Ages (New York:
Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), 273.
48
Ibid., 334.
49
Ibid., 859-860.
50
Strickland, The Great Warbow, 860.
47
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At Towton, March 29, 1461, both sides used a combination of swords, poleaxes,
halberds, axes, and longbows.51 The poleaxe was the preferred staff weapon at Towton.52 At
Agincourt, the preferred weapon for the dismounted English men-at-arms was a spear. The
poleaxe is both swung and thrust, thus exposing more areas of the body in its use. The longbow
as at Agincourt was the initial weapon used. Unlike at Agincourt, the longbow was being used
against fellow Englishmen rather than the French. Also at Agincourt, the fact that the English
had longbows and the French did not played a significant role. Now that both sides have the
longbow, the deciding factor was who utilized the weapon better along with utilizing other
factors at the battle.
The battle at Flodden, September 9, 1513, had the major shift in weaponry of the
cannon.53 The cannon was able to reach farther than the longbow, so for the first time in this
examination, the cannon is the first weapon armies had to worry about. The English had smaller
field cannons than the Scots allowing the English to maneuver the guns more effectively than the
Scots.54 The English also used the eight-foot bill instead of the longer pike of the Scots.55 The
English archers had a short sword and buckler to supplement their longbows.
In all three battles the longbow played a critical role for the English; it helps them to attrit
and disrupt their enemies to the point that their melee weapons could dispatch the rest of the
enemy. The biggest differences in weapons used in battle are that at Agincourt when the archers
joined in, they used any weapon they could get ahold of and the men-at-arms used lances. The

51

Philip A Haigh, The Military Campaigns of the Wars of the Roses (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton
Publishing Limited, 1995), 62.
52
Veronica Fiorato, Anthea Boylston, and Christopher Knusel ed., Blood Red Roses: The archaeology of a
mass grave from the Battle of Towton AD 1461 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2000), 150.
53
George Goodwin, Fatal Rivalry: Flodden 1513 Henry VIII, James IV and the Battle for Renaissance
Britain (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) , 197.
54
Ibid., 198-199.
55
Ibid., 204.

Johnson 21
English men-at-arms evolve their staff weapons from the lance at Agincourt to the poleaxe at
Towton, and finally to the bill at Flodden. Towton has the biggest change in weaponry; for melee
weapons, they primarily used poleaxes instead of lances.
The composition of the English army at Agincourt was around 5,000 archers and 900
men-at-arms.56 The archers were arrayed on the flanks of the men-at-arms.57 There was also a
contingent of archers that either started in front of the men-at-arms and pulled back as the French
approached, or that took up position in the middle of the English men-at-arms.58 The men-atarms were arrayed into a single line for battle.59 The archers had stakes that they placed in a
checkerboard fashion in front of their position to protect themselves from advancing French
troops.60 Also, when the archers started to join the melee they did not do so on an individual
initiative, but rather as a cohesive unit.61
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62

At the battle of Towton, both the Lancastrian and Yorkist forces were arrayed similarly to
each other. They each had their men-at-arms in three lines, the third being the rearguard and
reserve commanded by the leader of each army.63 The Yorkists had their archers in front of their
men-at-arms until the Lancastrian forces got too close, then the archers fell behind the men-atarms.64 Neither side had a cavalry force.
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65

The English army at Flodden was made up of 26,000 men. These 26,000 men were split
between Surrey and his son the Admiral. Surrey controlled the rearguard, his center had 5,000
men, his right wing was composed of 1,500 mounted troops and 1,500 men on foot, and on the
left wing was 3,000 men. The Admiral was with the vanguard; his center had 9,000 men, his left
and right wing had 3,000 men each.66 This is the first battle in this analysis where the English
have a mounted reserve component. This mounted reserve component was used to reinforce the
English from the initial pike advance of the Scots by joining the breaking English formation, thus
allowing the English to continue to fight.
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67

The biggest change in the composition of the armies of the English during the fifteenth
century is the percentage of archers used in the battles. At Agincourt, the overwhelming
percentage of men were archers; out of about 6,000 men, only 900 were men-at-arms, making
the archers about 85 percent of the army. At the battle of Towton, the number of archers is not
given, but Philip A. Haigh claims that the Lancastrians had 40,000 men-at-arms and the Yorkists
had 36,000 men-at-arms.68 Peter Reid claims that these numbers are too large and calculates the
number of men on both sides by counting the number of nobles and averaging the number of
men each would have and the number of additional forces that could be brought in from the
surrounding areas.69 Reid calculates that the Lancastrians would have 27,000 men total and the
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Yorkists would have 22,000.70 Reid believes the breakdown of the Lancastrian army to be “about
2,500 men-at-arms, some 12,500 archers and around 12,000 bill-men, while the Yorkists would
have had about 2,000 men-at-arms, 11,000 archers and 9,000 bill-men.”71 Haig's numbers seem
to be high, especially since he says his numbers are for men-at-arms only. Using Reid's
breakdown of the army it can be determined that the archers make up 46 percent of the
Lancastrian army and 50 percent of the Yorkist army. By the time of Flodden the artillery piece
had taken over the primary role of the longbow so it would seem likely that there would be even
fewer archers at that battle than at Towton. The primary role of the longbow, as seen at
Agincourt and Towton, was to strike the enemy at far distance and force the enemy to fight or
flee as well as disrupt the enemy during their advance. A constant similarity is that the English
fought on foot on all of these battles; Flodden was the only battle with mounted troops and they
were only about 6 percent of the army and the majority of the fighting was done by men on foot.
Topography at Agincourt from the English perspective was highly useful. The English
were positioned at the bottom of a long gentle incline, which is usually a disadvantage, but the
English were able to turn it into an advantage.72 The ground at Agincourt was extremely soft and
slippery since it was a newly sown wheat field.73 The soft ground also made it easier for the
archers to put in the stakes to defend their position.74 The English flanks, where the archers were
positioned, was against a thick tree line.75 This prevented the French from attacking the archers
from the archers’ flanks. The more French troops and cavalry that attack, the more of a quagmire
the ground become for the advancing French, making it almost impossible for them to advance
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even reasonably quickly.76 The English would have also been fighting on the rather muddy
ground. However, it would not be as large of a drawback for them since the English were
holding their ground instead of trying to take it. This experience could lead to the English
accepting armor that weighed more so that it could provide more protection while fighting in
place. Alternatively, they might recognize that they may need to advance through the mud in the
future and need to make sure that their legs are not restricted as much as possible.
Lancastrian and Yorkist forces were separated by a shallow valley at the beginning of the
battle at Towton.77 One of the armies was going to have to go downhill and then back uphill to
fight their enemy. There was also extremely high winds that were blowing snow into the face of
the Yorkist forces.78 When the wind flipped directions the Yorkists opened with longbow fire;
the wind carried the arrows farther than they would have gone otherwise and when the
Lancastrians shot back, their arrows fell short of the Yorkist lines.79 When the Yorkists
eventually pushed the Lancastrians back, the Lancastrians slipped and got trampled trying to go
up the snow-covered hill they originally came down.80 Many Lancastrians as they fled tried to
cross the River Cock and drowned because their armor weighed too much for them.81
Seizing Branxton Hill was the decisive objective for the English at Flodden that would
enable the English to defeat the Scots. In order to do that the English had to cross the River
Till.82 The river was swollen from heavy rains previously.83 The English also crossed the river at
two points that were a mile and half apart, because they needed to get the army across as much at
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the same time as possible and they had to use a specific bridge in order to move the heavy
cannons across.84 There was a large amount of smoke cover both the English and Scottish
movements; the smoke came from the burning of the Scots trash as they changed positions to
react to the English attack on Branxton Hill.85 Also after the first Scottish pike attack, the already
muddy ground become so bad that men's legs were sinking into it.86
In all three battles, the English utilized the elevation of the ground to their advantage. At
both Agincourt and Flodden, the English set up at the bottom of a hill. At Towton both sides
were on the top of hills separated by a shallow valley. All three battles were also fought on
ground that was extremely muddy or slippery. Agincourt and Flodden were both fought in the
fall, bringing rain, and Towton was fought in late winter, bringing snow.
Henry at Agincourt wanted to fight a defensive battle. He built a defensive position and was
then forced to move out it because he knew that the French would only gain in their number of
troops and would be able to resupply.87 Henry was not able to resupply unless he was able to get
past the French. When he did advance, he made sure that his archers brought their stakes with
them and he only advanced to bowshot range.88 Once he gets his archer into bowshot range, he
has them fire onto the French until the French are forced to fight or be cut down by arrows.
Instead of going to meet the French advance he waits for them to come to his men-at-arms and
uses his archers to thin out and disrupt the French ranks.89
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Both sides at the battle at Towton choose to take up positions on a hill, which is the
classic defensive position.90 The Yorkists fired first only because when the wind shifted, it gave
them the distinct advantage of being able to hit their enemy without being able to be attacked in
return.91 The barrage of arrows forced the Lancastrians to either attack or to withdraw from the
field; they choose to attack.92 The Yorkists, by striking first, forced their enemy to come to them
where they were already set up in a defensive position. This is very similar to what Henry did to
the French at Agincourt. The Yorkists were able to hold the Lancastrians off long enough for
their reinforcements to arrive and then with that advantage of fresh troops were able to drive the
Lancastrians back and ultimately defeated them.93
The English at Flodden were fighting an enemy who was in a better defensive position
than they were in. The English artillery pieces were more maneuverable and could fire more
accurately and faster than the Scots could counter, so the Scots were forced to attack the English
or be torn apart by the English artillery.94 This is continuing the English tactic used at both
Agincourt and Towton; attack the enemy in order to make them come out of their defensive
position. The Scots attacked with their pike-men and their first assault was rather successful;
they almost broke the English entirely and would have done so if it were not for the
reinforcement by the English mounted troops who were able to prevent English forces from
being overwhelmed.95 After the first assault was repelled, the Scots sent in their second wave of
pike-men and this assault would have had similar effects and could have destroyed the English
army if it was not for the mud that was created by the first wave of pike-men. The mud slowed
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and disrupted their assault and allowed the English longbow-men to start picking them off and
now that the pike formation had been disrupted, their reach advantage was negated; for pikes to
be effective they need to be part of a solid formation making it impossible for the enemy to get
around their blades.96 The Scots now had to get in close and fight in a more individualistic style.
The English bills were just short enough to be more nimble than the Scottish pikes, but they were
long enough to outreach the Scots' side-arms.97 This method ultimately defeated the Scots and
the English routed them.
In all three battles, the English did their best to fight a defensive battle. In all three in
order to get the enemy to go on the offensive, the English struck with long-range weapons that
the enemy could not counter except by advancing forward for a melee fight. At both Agincourt
and Flodden, the English were motivated to get the fight started sooner than they may have liked
because they were running low on supplies and had to fight through the enemy to get
resupplied.98
After examining all four categories of tactics for the fifteenth century English a strong
theme starts to emerge. There is little change in both the topography and the preference for
offense or defense. For weapons, the English men-at-arms evolve from wielding the spear
primarily to the poleaxe to the bill. The enemies of the English for melee evolve from using the
spear to the poleaxe to the pike. For ranged weapons, the English had to deal with crossbows
then longbows and finally cannon. As for composition, Agincourt seems to be the outlier with
such a huge number of archers; in the other two battles, the armies are dominated by men-atarms on foot. The changes in the weapons the English used caused an increase in demand for the
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ability to swing and deliver more powerful strokes as opposed to thrusts. The English armor also
had to be able to deflect or stop similar blows from harming the English. Changes in armor
would most likely be in response to these concerns.
When examining the four components of armor design, weight, thickness, hardness, and
design of the armor, there is a consistent manner to the progress. The weight of the helmet
steadily increases over time, while the weight of the breastplate remains relatively the same. This
could be from the increase in the use of more dangerous staff weapons. The way to deliver a
more powerful blow with staff weapon with an axe or hammer on it would be to raise the
weapon above the head and to bring it down with as much force possible. This would mean the
first thing to be threatened is the head rather than the chest. The chest would need to primarily
prevent thrusts from enemies trying to quickly attack while a powerful blow is being prepared.
The thickness of helmets start and end at the same level (more research should be done here),
and the thickness in breastplates over the heart region generally rose for the majority of last
quarter of the century. The hardness of armor also generally increased in the last quarter of the
century. The design of armor was modified slowly and usually in the same areas, protecting the
joints better, better protection for the neck, and protection for the upper thigh region increased.
This would provide the individual soldier with the ability to make more powerful attacks without
the concern of being wounded in sensitive areas.
In addition to the change in weapons in English battles another explanation as to why
English armor continued to change is that the English were constantly trying to find the best
armor to suit their tactical needs. This makes sense, instead of drastically altering your
equipment or your preferred fighting style; it would be easier instead to slowly change the armor
in specific areas. The English over the century had plenty of battles in which to discover what
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their needs are on the battlefield for their armor. By not changing tactically, they are able to
predict what problems they will encounter in battle and so they can adjust accordingly.
English armor and English tactics during 1415-1515 adds to the discussion on whether it
is technology that drives tactics or if it is tactics that drives technology. When focusing on armor,
I believe that it is the tactics used that drive the technology. The shape of English armor steadily
adds more protection to areas that are found to have weak spots, such as joints and the neck. The
weight of English helmets reveal an increase in weight, which corresponds to the prevalence of
poleaxes and bills. The thickness of the front breastplates increases as the side lessens, most
likely to maintain the same weight, shows that a certain importance was given to one area over
another. If it were the technology driving the tactics there would probably be more variation in
armor design and more visible experimentation on how to design armor. The battles themselves
would most likely not be consistent in three out of the four categories examined.
Armor being a technology that is driven by tactics makes sense. Armor is a defensive
piece of technology so it is reasonable to be reactive to the situation that it is placed. For a
technology to drive tactics, it has to make the army attack or defend differently. Armor, in 14151515 England, supplemented the tactics already in use. Armor was changed to meet threats of
more deadly weapons, to make it easier wield new weapons, or to prolong the wearer’s ability to
fight. English armor from 1415-1515 responded to tactical requirements found in battle.
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